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From Marxism-Leninism to Ethnicity: The 
Sideslips of Ethiopian Elitism  
Messay Kebede  
University of Dayton, Ohio  
For many scholars, colonialism and neocolonial policies remain the root causes of 
Africa’s numerous impediments to its progress, ranging from the persistence of 
poverty to the ravages of ethnic conflicts. However, the number of scholars who 
prefer to ascribe these impediments essentially to the persistence of traditional 
views and methods and to the lack of reforms radical enough to trigger a sustained 
process of modernization is not negligible. My position contests this either-or 
debate and identifies the culprit as the rise of African elitism—a phenomenon 
implicating the specific effect of colonialism in conjunction with internal African 
contributions. I take the case of Ethiopia as a pertinent illustration of the 
precedence of elitism over other hindrances. The fact that Ethiopia, though not 
colonized, has followed the same declining course as other African countries 
underlines the derailing role of modern education, whose embedded Eurocentric 
orientations were quick to uproot those sectors of Ethiopian society that were 
exposed to it. The outcome was elitism, which spearheaded the trend of deeper 
marginalization and incapacitation of the country. But first, let me give concrete 
meaning to the concept of elitism.  
What Is Elitism?  
The confirmation of elitism as a characteristic effect of colonial rule is not hard to 
establish. The first scholar who drew attention to the phenomenon of elitism in 
Africa was a Western missionary by the name of Placide Tempels. In his 
controversial book, Bantu Philosophy, written in  
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1945, Tempels defends the idea that the Bantu people have a rationally constructed 
philosophy. The revolutionary message of the book is easily admitted when it is 
recalled that the denial of philosophy, which was almost a universal European 
attitude, was the manner in which the rationality of Africans was contested. Since 
the denial was none other than the justification of colonialism as a civilizing 
mission, it is no surprise that many African scholars hail Tempels as “a real 
revolutionary, both in philosophy and in anticolonial discourse.”
1 
 
In addition to refuting the colonial allegation that Africans are irrational and 
immature people, Tempels reflects on the evil consequences of denying philosophy 
to native peoples. The trend of considering the African cultural legacy as a 
collection of irrational and absurd beliefs, he notes, turned the clearing of the 
African mind of these beliefs into a prerequisite for the inculcation of Western 
ideas. Instead of dialogue and exchange of ideas, acculturation thus took the 
direction of uprooting natives on the grounds that they would become fit for 
Westernization only through the removal of their cultural legacy. Tempels 
consistently blames this colonial method for causing irreparable damage, 
especially for accelerating dehumanization and loss of centeredness among the 
Bantu. “In condemning the whole gamut of their supposed ‘childish and savage 
customs’ by the judgment ‘this is stupid and bad,’ we [missionaries] have taken 
our share of the responsibility for having killed ‘the man’ in the Bantu,”
2 
he writes.  
A characteristic result of this inhuman method is the advent of the évolués—a 
French term characterizing those natives who supposedly evolve into civilized 
Africans as a result of colonial education. Tempels has no kind words to describe 
the évolués. He calls them from the start “déracinés and degenerates”;
3 
elsewhere 
he speaks of them as “empty and unsatisfied souls—would be Europeans—and as 
such, negations of civilized beings,” as “moral and intellectual tramps, capable 
only, despite themselves, of being elements of strife.”
4 
All these severe flaws point 
the finger at colonial methods: molded to despise their legacy, these uprooted 
Africans have so internalized the colonial attitude that they end up by nurturing a 
contempt for their own peoples similar to that of the colonizer.  
To show that colonial education produces people with a colonizing turn of 
mind, Tempels stresses that the évolués “have no longer any respect for their old 
institutions, or for the usages and customs which, nevertheless, by their profound 
significance, form the basis of the practical application in Bantu life of natural 
law.”
5 
Since the primary function of the évolués is to serve as local instruments of 
colonial rule, their teaching, training, and mode of life dispose them to construe the 
dislike of their own legacy as a norm of civilized behavior.  
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In particular, when in addition to being cut off from their society and pristine 
beliefs, these évolués feel in their bones the inhumanity of their colonial masters, 
what else can rise within them but disillusionment and general cynicism? How can 
they avoid cynicism when, for all the loss of commitment to their tradition they 
have gone through, the colonial society still rejects them? Is it surprising if these 
would-be Europeans internalize all the vices of the colonizer without assimilating 
any of the positive aspects of modernity? Tempels fully understands the awkward 
position of the évolués: mesmerized by the power of the colonizer, yet repulsed by 
his racist contempt. He defines them as “profoundly distrustful or embittered” by 
the obvious lack of “recognition of and respect for their full value as men by the 
Whites.”
6 
Because their hopes have been raised only to be knocked down without 
mercy, humiliation for these people is a source of constant torment. So mortifying 
is their humiliation that it seeks appeasement even in manifestations of eccentricity 
and megalomania, obvious as it is that the need to impress the colonizer at all costs 
grows into an itch.  
This means that the opposition of the évolués to colonial rule hides deeper 
emotional disorders that push them toward negative and destructive behaviors. In 
this respect, the error has been to take at face value the rebellious stand of the 
évolués. No doubt, their role has been decisive in the struggle for independence. 
But it is one thing to rise against alien rule, and quite another to develop an 
independent policy and turn of mind. To overlook this distinction is to miss the 
extent to which the perpetuation of colonial rule under the guise of independence 
remains the appalling reality of Africa.  
Let us agree to call African elitism the entitlement to an uncontested leadership 
inferred from the privilege of being exposed to modern education. The inference 
singles out the évolués as heirs to the civilizing mission. It is as though 
Westernization passes on to local elites the right to rule; that is, to continue the 
unfinished business of colonialism. In other words, to rule is still a civilizing 
mission, with this difference: that it is assumed by natives rescued from 
primitiveness. The entitlement to rule maintains the belief that Africans are indeed 
primitive, and so calls for methods of government similar to colonial rule. The 
reality of native rulers thinking and acting like former colonizers makes up the sub-
stance of African elitism.  
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Basil Davidson has described well the process of its institution:  
The regimes installed at independence became rapidly subject to upsets and 
uproars. Striving to contain these, the multi-party parliamentary systems 
gave way increasingly, whether in theory or practice, to one-party systems. 
Most of these one-party systems at this stage, perhaps all of them, decayed 
into no-party systems as their ruling elements became fully bureaucratized. 
Politics came to an end; mere administration took its place, reproducing 
colonial autocracy as the new “beneficiaries” took the place of the old 
governors.
7 
 
Colonialism, it follows, remains the major source of hindrance, not so much due to 
its plunder and destruction—which though not negligible were nevertheless 
reparable—as due to its ideological legacy. The colossal human wreckage caused 
by the internalization of the colonial discourse and so aptly personified by the 
évolués is the way Africa was handed over to psychopathic personalities.  
To be specific, what defines elitism is the normative union of knowledge with 
power, that is, the assumption that those who get exposed to Western education 
should also rule. Behind this entitlement to rule, we find the ethos of the évolués 
who, having internalized the Western discourse, take on the task of rescuing their 
society from barbarism and ignorance. It is because modernization is perceived as 
a passage from savagery to civilization that knowledge and enlightenment entitle 
one to power. So defined, modernization construes power as tutorship, and so 
designates the educated elite as the legitimate heir to colonial rule. The situation, 
then, is that educated Africans present themselves, in the words of Davidson, as 
those who were to be the instruments of applying the European model to Africa, 
and therefore as the saviors of the continent. Being sure of the values of their 
Western education, they were convinced of their superiority over the vast majority 
of their compatriots: who but they, after all, possessed the keys to the powerhouse 
of knowledge whence European technology and conquest had flowed?
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The assignment to civilize completely redefines the role of the state. According 
to the influential liberal theory, modern states imply a contract of citizens among 
themselves and with the government as a result of which the latter becomes 
accountable to the former. Classical Marxist theory insists that the contract does 
not involve the working people, there being no doubt that governments protect the 
interests of ruling classes. The attribution of a modernizing role to the state adds a 
civilizing mission to the normal administrative and political functions of the state. 
In other words, following the colonial paradigm, from representative of social 
forces the state grows into a tutor. And who can direct this state if not those natives 
who have access to Western knowledge? Since civilization must come from 
outside, power must become tutorship. This equation produces elitism in all its 
various forms.  
One African scholar who has closely studied the phenomenon of elitism and its 
negative effects is V. Y. Mudimbe. Specifically referring to “elitism and Western 
dependency,”
9 
Mudimbe shows that both are products of Africans talked into the 
vilifying of the African past and legacy by Western indoctrination.  
The proven method of indoctrination is “the static binary opposition between 
tradition and modernity,”
10 
whose consequence is to rule out the presentation of 
modernity as an extension, a continuation, of tradition. Pushed to the other side of 
modernity, tradition appears as the major obstacle that must be liquidated for 
evolution to take off. Consent to this liquidation produces the évolué as precisely 
the one who, having a foot in both the modern and traditional worlds, best 
promotes the hierarchical order of colonialism by serving as a reliable liaison 
between colonized and colonizers.  
It scarcely needs to be pointed out that the acquiescence of Africans in the 
colonial description of African tradition is what nurtures the elitist mentality by 
reviving the évolué sleeping in every “educated” African. It causes a characteristic 
blur, assimilating the use of colonial conceptions and methods to an enlightened 
and positive approach. As a result of this mix-up, the indigenous societies of Africa 
will not so much be transformed as replaced by modern, secular societies; the key 
agents of this process will be indigenous elites, including business elites or capi-
talists, conceived of as bearers of the necessary universal values of global 
modernity.
11 
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As substitutes for colonizers and in their inability to whiten themselves, the 
évolués decide on a condescending and paternalistic attitude that, however far it 
falls short of being racist, is nevertheless entitlement to privilege and uncontested 
leadership.  
To sum up, the elitist attitude echoes the colonial mentality and means that the 
moral bankruptcy of the educated elite is a direct consequence of the endorsement 
of the idea of primitive Africa. The act by which Africans welcome Western 
education is the act by which they acquiesce to the colonial discourse on Africa: 
the one is inseparable from the other. As a result, educated Africans are unable to 
adopt a moral standard: the contempt—mostly unconscious—that they feel for 
Africanness totally deprives them of ethical relationships with themselves and their 
original society. Disdain and nonaccountability appear to them as the only ways by 
which to demonstrate their complete emancipation from their legacy. Imperative, 
therefore, is the recognition, as a major explanation of the numerous African 
impediments, of the fact that modern African states have simply replaced the 
colonial states. Because “Africans replaced the Europeans officials right to the top 
of the bureaucracy”
12 
without the prior dismantling of the colonial state and 
methods, especially without a far-reaching decolonization of the educated and 
political elites, it is small wonder that the same structure and turn of mind produce 
similar results.  
The Ethiopian Drift into Elitism  
A noticeable and important distinction between Ethiopia and other African 
countries is, we know, its escape from colonization after a decisive military victory 
in 1896 over a colonial power. Combined with the other distinctive characteristics 
of Ethiopia, namely, the protracted existence of an Ethiopian state (the so-called 
Solomonic dynasty) with a well-defined class structure (the gebar system) and a 
nationalist ideology (the Kibre Negest), the repulsion of colonial aggression 
announced the inevitability of the rise of an African power on par with modern 
European states. So promising was the prospect that many observers predicted the 
repetition of the Japanese experience by Ethiopia.  
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To show that expectation was high in Europe, especially after the victory of 
Adwa, a Paris journal, La liberté, editorialized: “All European countries will be 
obliged to make a place for this new brother who steps forth ready to play in the 
dark continent the role of Japan in the Far East.”
13 
 
In light of this expectation, the failure and underdevelopment of Ethiopia turn 
into an appalling enigma, all the more so as the usual explanation of the African 
impediment by colonialism is here ruled out. That Ethiopia escaped colonization 
means essentially that power and ideological leadership did not devolve on the 
évolués. Instead, there was a remarkable continuity, as evidenced by the opening of 
Ethiopia to the modern world through the agency of its traditional ruling elite. So 
this fact of Ethiopia becoming underdeveloped while no leadership of the évolué 
type hampered its evolution seems to backfire on my thesis ascribing the African 
predicament to elitism. If there is one country in Africa that was protected against 
the rise of the évolués, this country was Ethiopia.  
Let us not rush to conclusions, however. Ethiopia’s escape from the political 
domination of colonialism must be viewed against the background of the large 
doors that it naïvely opened to Western education in the name of modernization. In 
our study of the évolués, we have emphasized that the disastrous consequences of 
colonial conquest result less from economic and social disruptions than from 
mental colonization. Accordingly, the reckless opening of Ethiopia to modern 
education brings us back to the same issue of elitism with even greater strength, 
since we catch the uprooting and alienating effects of such an education working in 
a sovereign way. It shows that the inglorious and cumbersome conquest of Africa 
was not necessary: to achieve the colonization of the mind, with its set of 
marginalizing thinking, copyism, and dictatorial methods, in short, elitism, the 
spread of Western education was enough.  
Nowhere is this truth better illustrated than in the radicalization of Ethiopian 
student movements and educated circles in the 1960s and 1970s. True, this 
radicalism implicates Haile Selassie’s postponement of necessary social and 
political reforms. But the postponement does not fully explain the shift to 
radicalism: a predisposition portraying the ills of Ethiopian society as so 
entrenched and stubborn that nothing less than a radical reshuffling was required 
must be added to the lack of reforms. The overwhelming dominance of 
revolutionary mood over reformist tendencies cannot be satisfactorily explained 
other than by the corrosive effects of Western education on the student movements 
and intelligentsia. The dichotomy between tradition and modernity and the 
subsequent presentation of the break with tradition as a necessary precondition of 
modernization—this bedrock of Western education—explains the leaning toward 
revolutionary analyses to the detriment of reformist remedies.  
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This analysis finds remarkable support in Tekeste Negash’s book, The Crisis of 
Ethiopian Education. In that book, Negash brings out the essentially uprooting role 
that modern education assumed in Ethiopia during Haile Selassie’s reign and, with 
greater reason, during the Derg’s “socialist” rule. In Negash’s eyes, the teaching of 
a “boundless hatred of their country and its society”
14 
to students has been the main 
purpose of modern education. Its outcome has been the elitist mentality that talked 
students into perceiving themselves as “infallible semi-gods”
15 
destined for 
undivided leadership. Negash traces the origin of this megalomania back to the 
ideological vacuum created by the distortion and neglect of the teaching of 
Ethiopian history.  
Taught only in grade ten, Ethiopian history was portrayed by textbooks, 
especially by those of the Derg, as the unspeakable reign of a rotten feudal system 
whose backwardness and limitless exploitation of peasants condemned the country 
to be one of the poorest nations in the world, thus squarely blaming tradition and 
the past for the present ills without balancing it with an account of the positive 
side. The history course amounted to an infusion of “shame, contempt and 
disgust.”
16 
Such remarkable successes as the evolving of “a political state that 
endured for nearly two thousand years” and the achievement of a rich and varied 
culture that integrated different ethnic groups into “a functioning political 
framework”
17 
were systematically downplayed.  
This grave deficiency, together with the systematic pursuit of debasement, 
prompted Negash to speak of a “curriculum” with a “strikingly colonial 
character.”
18 
 
This work originally appeared in Northeast African Studies, 10:2, 2015, 
published by Michigan State University. 
Even though, unlike the Derg, Haile Selassie had constantly pleaded for an 
approach balancing tradition and modernity, his prudence was nullified by his 
reliance on a massive foreign teaching corps whose commitment to Ethiopian 
interests was peripheral, as well as by his intention to use modern education to 
consolidate his own autocratic rule. The debasement has today reached its climax 
with the establishment of an ethnic regime and the proliferation of ethnic 
movements whose grudges against the Ethiopian state, however legitimate they 
may be, are so excessive and one-sided that they echo the colonial disparagement 
of whatever is natively African. On the strength of his conviction that 
“underdevelopment cannot be overcome until such time when the citizens of a 
country begin to appreciate their history,”
19 
Negash advises that “the cultivation of 
Ethiopian nationalism and patriotism . . . deserves priority.”
20 
 
The history of the Ethiopian intellectual movement squarely confirms the merit 
of this analysis. Let us take the case of the first intellectuals, those whose 
contributions took place before the Italian occupation of 1935. Addis Hiwet called 
them “Japanizers,” because they saw in the transformation of the post-Meiji 
modernization of Japan “a living model for Ethiopia: the liquidation of feudalism 
and the development of capitalism through the agency of the modern state—i.e. a 
revolution from above.”
21 
Yet the label “Japanizers,” appealing though it may be, is 
misleading, if only because the predominant inspiration of the said intellectuals 
was less to modernize tradition than to copy the West.  
Not only did they openly call for the establishment of Haile Selassie’s 
autocratic rule through the disablement of the Ethiopian nobility, which they 
considered as incorrigibly reactionary and rotten, but most of them also had a 
profoundly iconoclastic view of Ethiopian culture and traditions. None of these 
views reflects the Japanese style, which took, we know, an integrative course 
resulting in the incorporation of many traditional elements into the process of 
modernization, besides avoiding the path of autocracy.  
The alienation of these first Ethiopian intellectuals is best exemplified by 
Afework Gebre Yesus, the author of Tobbya. A great admirer of the West, Yesus 
crossed the threshold of treason by turning into a staunch collaborator with the 
Italians during their occupation of Ethiopia. His tragedy is symptomatic of the deep 
contradiction of the Ethiopian intellectual movement: he loved Ethiopia as much as 
he admired the West. The conviction that the Ethiopian ruling class was utterly 
unwilling to modernize led him to endorse colonization as the only means to 
modernize Ethiopia. The error is to see his move as an accident or an exception: 
Yesus was simply consistent.  
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For Yesus, since modernization means Westernization, what matters is the 
resolution to modernize, not the specific nationality of the modernizing agent. In 
this regard, the Ethiopian ruling elite has demonstrated its noncandidacy by its 
utterly reactionary views and policy. So Yesus’s treason, correctly analyzed, 
reflects the hidden inspiration of all Ethiopians exposed to Western education, to 
wit, the longing for colonization. Whether this colonization is effected by 
Westerners or natives is immaterial as long as the contents and the goal are clearly 
set. We can even say, as Yesus did, that because the original is better than the 
copy, direct colonization will achieve better results than modernization by proxy. 
Accordingly, the truth is that, while some of the first Ethiopian intellectuals, to 
quote Bahru Zewde, “may have fleetingly considered foreign rule as a way out for 
their country’s backwardness, few went as far as Afework did.”
22 
 
The other most important figure among the “Japanizers,” Gebre Hiwot 
Baykedagn, while ruling out recourse to foreign rule, arrives at the same image of 
Ethiopia in deadlock. For him too, the archaic beliefs and customs of Ethiopia and 
the hopelessly conservative attitude of the nobility and the clergy stand in the way 
of Ethiopian modernization. The solution is to get rid of these obstacles, the 
instrument being, this time, not foreign rule but Western education. The main goal 
is to produce an elite capable of replacing the nobility and the clergy. This strategy 
of replacing the traditional elite with Western-educated state servants had one 
prerequisite: the rise of an autocrat who would be powerful enough to marginalize 
the traditional elite. Thus, following his belief that what Ethiopia needed was “a 
man of order, energy, intellect and experience . . . who is both a friend of Progress 
and Absolutism,”
23 
Baykedagn identified Haile Selassie as the most appropriate 
candidate.  
The deviations of these two representatives of the early intellectuals of Ethiopia 
indicate where the difference lies between them and those of the 1960s. 
Undoubtedly, a deeper assessment of the Ethiopian deadlock and a complete loss 
of confidence in the traditional elite as well as in the emerging modern sectors 
singles out the educated men and women of the 1960s. The reluctance of Haile 
Selassie to apply reforming measures and the apparent connivance of the 
“bourgeois” sectors would lead to greater desperation about a class or a sector of 
Ethiopian society ever assuming the leading role in the positive transformation of 
Ethiopia. Totally abandoning the Japanizers’ call for an autocrat, the intellectuals 
of the 1960s came round to the idea that intellectuals themselves must seize power 
to implement the necessary reforms.  
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In this regard, no theory has been more influential than Leninism. In particular, 
the views that Lenin develops in his famous pamphlet, What Is to Be Done, 
appeared relevant to Ethiopia. Under the pretext that in the era of imperialism, 
native aristocratic or bourgeois classes prefer an alliance with imperialist forces to 
a revolutionary change, Lenin develops the principle that intellectuals, going 
beyond their normal role as bureaucrats, technicians, researchers, educators, and 
critics, should also become political leaders. In response to the perceived deadlock 
of Third World countries, itself due to the absence of a revolutionary bourgeoisie, 
Lenin proposes the theory of revolutionary intellectuals as a substitute. His 
argument that power and knowledge must come into the same hands is further 
strengthened by his assumption that, left to itself, the working class would be “able 
to develop only trade-union consciousness,” so that the leadership must pass on to 
“the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals.”
24 
 
Other Marxist intellectuals (Antonio Gramsci, Mao Tse-tung, Frantz Fanon, and 
so on) have added their voices, turning the conjunction of power and knowledge 
into a credo of revolutionary movements in Third World countries.  
What is one to conclude from this? That the radicalization of the Ethiopian 
student movements and educated circles in the 1960s and 1970s, especially their 
strong leaning toward Marxism-Leninism, no doubt a product of the deferment of 
reforms, is a logical development from the growing impact of Western education. 
To the question of why the reformist option was marginalized, the answer is that 
the theory that best produced an iconoclastic analysis of Ethiopia, of its ruling class 
and beliefs, was none other than Marxism-Leninism. Despite its undeniable 
commitment to justice and equality, the theory echoes the colonial description of 
native societies in its evolutionary views, in its rejection of traditionality, and most 
of all, in the historical role that it assigns to the évolués. Moreover, the theory 
would not have had such an influence were it not arousing and legitimizing the 
political ambition of educated circles. In a word, it is the theory that gives elitism 
its most powerful backing.  
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What we know of Ethiopian student movements and Marxist-Leninist parties, 
including the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All-Ethiopia 
Socialist Movement (MEISON), confirms their elitist drift. All referred to the 
reality of the Ethiopian social impasse and, agreeing with Leninism, thought the 
way out to be the seizure of political power by radicalized intellectuals. The move 
creates a new type of power, that is, a power aiming at liberating the masses rather 
than enforcing a particular interest. In a word, it creates a tutorial power: in the 
name of a class or large sections of the people, conceived unfit to conquer political 
hegemony, an enlightened group aspires to or seizes power. It claims to have the 
mandate for tutorship until the class or the people become mature enough to 
assume the task of self-government. Because politics thus shifts from 
administration to domestication, elitism is unthinkable without the assignment to 
modernize, itself understood in terms of snatching the ignorant masses from 
traditionality. Entirely agreeing with the colonial paradigm of the civilizing 
mission, elitism asserts that, in light of the larger society being immobilized by 
centuries of apathy, fatalism, and barbarism, salvation must come from outside, 
from the enlightened few. When leading Ethiopian intellectuals hailed the 
revolutionary role of organized intellectuals, little did they realize that they were 
advocating a revamped version of colonial rule.  
Most importantly, Ethiopian intellectuals did not realize how inevitably they 
were heading toward a dictatorial regime in the name of the people. The way they 
described themselves and their goal could not help but institute dictatorship, for the 
simple reason that the moral authority and selfness they bestowed on themselves as 
liberators of the working people turned them into semi-gods with no accountability 
to any social force. So disinterested and generous a goal is, by definition, beyond 
any question and so demands absolute submission. This is how a former activist 
describes his comrades: “EPRP’s leading activists had no hidden agenda except 
struggling for what they believed was just—the well being of the Ethiopian poor. . 
. . I am convinced that Ethiopia still mourns the death of its brightest and selfless 
children.”
25 
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In thus presenting themselves as having no particular interest, nay, as being 
beyond any interest except the cause of the poor, the intellectuals puffed 
themselves up with such a moral authority that they soared above accountability, 
thereby giving themselves over to the worst type of paternalism. Relations among 
people can never be on an equal footing if one party claims that it has no interest 
and motivation other than those of the other party. Such a claim annuls equality by 
turning the one into a granter and the other into a grantee. It is high time that 
intellectuals present themselves to the Ethiopian peoples as ordinary persons 
having specific interests and many limitations. Only then can they evolve 
contractual relationships with the masses whose support they need to defend their 
interests in the framework of a pluralist society. Only when they admit that they 
have particular interests can they get out of paternalism by clearly understanding 
that in defending the interests of the masses they are simply defending their own 
particular interests. This is called general interest and partnership as a result of 
solidarity being created on the basis of mutual interests, and not on the basis of one 
party granting rights to the other party and deceitfully claiming to be without 
interest.  
Crucially important was the fact that most people became convinced that elitism 
was the way to go. Allow me to resort to my own experience. I still remember 
vividly the time when people, especially women, were cheering us in the streets 
with yililta on the first day of the opening of schools after the long vacation of the 
rainy season. We were a bunch of kids going from the Gulele area where we lived 
to the French school, the Lycée Guebre Mariam, on foot. Nothing was more 
expressive of the popular expectation than this cheering crowd.  
The Ethiopian saying, yetemare yigdelegn, best incarnates the expectation that 
modern schools produce the saviors of Ethiopia. Without doubt, this popularization 
of modern education goes to the credit of Haile Selassie. Thanks to his constant 
exhortation and the direct involvement of his uncontested authority, the popular 
response was not hard to come by: as a scholar notes, “even bearded and senior 
men push their way into the schools, humbly but determinedly anxious, like their 
children, to learn English.”
26 
The prestige of having a Western education was such 
that the legitimation of power became unthinkable without some intellectual halo. 
And what could be more sanctifying than the brandishing of the theory of 
Marxism-Leninism? On top of claiming to be entirely scientific, the theory has an 
answer to all the questions. Above all, its deep humanitarian goals give it an 
unmatched moral authority. All this worked toward the belief that 
Marxism-Leninism alone entitles a person to power.  
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The irony, however, is that Ethiopian Marxist-Leninists were beaten at their 
own game by a sector of the military apparatus. Following the overthrow of the 
imperial regime, a group of military men, calling itself the Derg, hijacked the 
Marxist-Leninist discourse and rose to power by claiming to have the historic 
mission of leading the country toward socialism. To crown it all, a man among 
those that the criterion of high education least advantaged, namely, Menguistu 
Haile Mariam, emerged as the uncontested leader of the Derg and established 
absolute power. Yet, something of the intellectual justification remained, since 
Mariam presented himself as the most dedicated promoter of Marxism-Leninism.  
To prove his commitment, in lieu of having the intellectual references, Mariam 
resorted to terror and killing, the only way he knew to impress Ethiopians and the 
then-socialist countries and convince them that he was indeed a true Marxist. This 
is to say that the intellectualization of power is responsible for both creating the 
Derg and causing the erratic and sanguinary behavior of Mariam. No sooner is the 
state viewed as more of a tutor than an administrator, in line with the colonial idea 
of the civilizing mission, than it ceases to be accountable to the society. You 
cannot recognize people as sovereign judges while believing that they are ignorant, 
passive, and unable to govern themselves. A democratic attitude requires respect 
for the people, a course of thinking that elitism cannot adopt, diverted as it is by 
the mentality of the évolué.  
Granted that the exposure to Western education has prepared the ground for the 
adoption of a Marxist-Leninist approach in Ethiopia, the fact remains that 
adherence to the theory would not have been systematic and widespread without 
the Eritrean issue. Though Ethiopia was not colonized, the centeredness of 
traditionalist thinking was irremediably contaminated from within by the 
annexation of Eritrea, which had been an Italian colony since 1890.  
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The immediate result of the incorporation was that Eritrea became the Trojan 
horse of colonialism, especially in schools and among students as well as among 
military officers. The undermining from within of Ethiopian centeredness took two 
interrelated directions. The first direction has to do with many Eritreans having no 
loyalty or having lost loyalty to the Ethiopian ruling elite: their involvement in 
Ethiopian society introduced a dissenting voice that was bound to be catching. It 
specially targeted the Amhara ruling elite, for which most Eritreans had nothing 
but contempt. Essentially inherited from the colonial time, this contempt 
considered the Amhara as utterly backward and the Eritreans as civilized évolué. 
This view made Amhara rule particularly intolerable, so that the Italian 
colonization of Ethiopia, though it failed militarily, was revived by the Eritrean 
incorporation.  
The second direction points to the Eritrean input into the radicalization of 
Ethiopian student and intellectual movements. To accommodate the Eritrean 
dissent, especially to counter the separatist tendency, the Ethiopian student 
movements and intellectuals had to agree to a radical reshuffling of Ethiopian 
society. They had to contemplate the end of the monarchy and all that it 
represented, thereby forsaking the reformist line. The radical theory of 
Marxism-Leninism was most welcome, as it claimed to provide a solution to the 
question of nationalities. As theorized by Marxism-Leninism, the only genuine 
response to the Eritrean unrest could be the absolute equality of all the 
nationalities, based on the class interests of the working masses and the institution 
of regional autonomy.  
 
As one former member of the EPRP wrote:  
the majority of the Ethiopian radicals did not accept the inevitability of 
Eritrean independence. They believed that the recognition of the right to 
self-determination and the expediency of the formation of an independent 
state were two separate issues. They were still hopeful that, in the proper 
circumstances, class solidarity would prevail over nationalism and Eritreans 
would choose to remain with Ethiopia.
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It is my firm contention that without the attempt to accommodate the Eritrean 
demands, no major drift into Marxism-Leninism would have occurred, and, by 
extension, no ethnicization of Ethiopian politics would have resulted. As in other 
countries, the radical option would have attracted a minority while the rest would 
have stood firm for a reformist course.  
From Marxism-Leninism to Ethnicity  
Unsurprisingly, the separatist tone of the Eritrean resistance had a great impact on 
the Tigrayan educated elite. Already sensitized by the protracted rivalry between 
the Amhara and Tigrayan ruling elites and upset by the marginalization of Tigray 
following the triumphant establishment of a centralized monarchy under Haile 
Selassie, the Tigrayan educated elite was ready to push the ethnic issue as the 
major problem of Ethiopia. Also, neighborliness, linguistic identity, blood 
relationships, and so forth worked toward a rapprochement between Tigrayan and 
Eritrean analyses of Ethiopia even if few Tigrayans endorsed the Eritrean view of 
the Ethiopian state as colonial rule.  
To unravel the connection between Marxist-Leninist ideology and eth-
nonationalism, it is necessary first to reflect on the colonial ideology itself, 
especially on the promotion of the idea of race in conjunction with colonial racism. 
Indeed, one lasting legacy of colonial rule in Africa is the categorization of peoples 
as belonging to different and unequal human races. That this colonial heritage has 
opened the door to the ethnicization of African social life is not hard to establish. 
Fanon, for instance, gives a good idea of the logical connection between race and 
ethnicity when he elaborates on his warning that the mere replacement of colonial 
rulers by Africans will only result in a dependent policy reproducing the 
syndromes of colonial governments. In postcolonial Africa, he notes, “we observe 
a falling back toward old tribal attitudes, and, furious and sick at heart, we perceive 
that race feeling in its most exacerbated form is triumphing.”
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Inherited from the colonial mentality, the rise of ethnicity is thus nothing more 
than racism in the African style. It is definitely an expression of colonized 
mentality in that it classifies, separates, and excludes peoples on the basis of 
natural characteristics. To show that the dependent African elite exactly reproduces 
the principle of colonial rule, Fanon reminds us how, “by its very structure, 
colonialism is separatist and regionalist. Colonialism does not simply state the 
existence of tribes; it also reinforces it and separates them.”
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This is to say that people who have come under colonial rule have a great 
propensity to value ethnic belonging. If so, the conceptualization of ethnic issues 
as the major problem of Ethiopia must be attributed to the ethnicization of the 
Eritrean opposition, which is an outcome of the colonial heritage of Eritrea. For 
those who doubt the connection, I remind them that the view of Ethiopia as an 
Amhara colony, before being espoused by Eritreans and some Oromo intellectuals, 
was an idea that Italians had originated to undermine the Ethiopian resistance. 
They promoted the notion of “Greater Tigre” as well as that of “Greater Somalia,” 
and during the five years of occupation divided Ethiopia along ethnic lines to 
activate “the revolt of the non-Amhara populations such as the Oromo and the 
Muslims.”
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This reminder of the colonial authorship of the assimilation of the Ethiopian 
regime to colonial rule only strengthens the extent to which Eritrean and Ethiopian 
ethnonationalist movements feed on the colonial view of Ethiopia.  
Naturally, the Eritrean characterization of Ethiopia had a prime seductive effect 
on Tigrayan and Oromo educated circles. The rivalry between Amhara and 
Tigrayan elites and the injustice of land ownership in the south paved the way for 
the ethnicization of Tigrayan and Oromo intellectuals. While Tigrayans denounced 
Amhara domination, some Oromo intellectuals, going further in the direction of the 
colonial theory, began to target the disintegration of Ethiopia and the emergence of 
an independent Oromia. The part played by missionary education in the generation 
of Oromo intellectuals committed to secession should not be ignored, given that 
the secessionist trend is unthinkable without significant encroachments, Protestant 
or otherwise, on the advances of Orthodox Christianity. This authorizes us to 
characterize the rise of ethnicity in Ethiopia as a contamination of legitimate 
grievances with racist views through the agency of Eritrea.  
As Leenco Lata admits, “Eritrea’s incorporation into Ethiopia thus 
unexpectedly resulted in heightening the grievances of other southern peoples.”
31 
Seeing that people easily give in to the pragmatic criterion of success as an 
expression of truth, it is little wonder that the definitive impact of Eritrean 
resistance on Ethiopian opposition movements has been their growing conviction 
that ethnicization conditions success.  
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Another explanation of the shift from Marxism-Leninism to ethnicity is the 
resonance of the ethnic paradigm with the Leninist ideal as it appears in What Is To 
Be Done. The odyssey of selfless intellectuals liberating the working people from 
class exploitation is replayed with even greater fervor when these intellectuals 
think of freeing from ethnic oppression none other than their own kin. Equally 
relevant to ethnic mobilization is the Leninist supposition that working people need 
tutors to defend their interests. In addition to being taught to identify their separate 
interests, the ethnically oppressed need tutors whose devotion is warranted by the 
sharing of the same blood. That is why, just as Marxist-Leninists leaders do, ethnic 
nationalists like to theorize. The possession of a theory of history is what lifts them 
from ordinary politicians to saviors and liberators of their people. This theoretical 
aptitude, in turn, establishes their exclusive legitimacy. Just as Marxist-Leninist 
groups used to claim the exclusive right to represent the interest of the working 
masses, so, too, ethnic movements deny other groups the right to represent people 
if they are not ethnically related to them. This battle for legitimacy was effectively 
fought in Ethiopia: while the MAESON and the EPRP claimed “the exclusive right 
to implement Lenin’s formula in Ethiopia . . . the TPLF adamantly rejected such a 
subordination of national liberation struggle to class struggle. By doing so, it 
succeeded to fend off these parties’ encroachment into Tigrean society.”
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A pertinent and recent example of the theoretical mania of ethnic movements is 
the debate that Meles Zenawi forced on his party to justify the dismissal of his 
opponents. The debate introduced the concept of “Bonapartism” and the idea of 
“new Ethiopianness.”
33 
Given that Zenawi had in mind nothing more than the 
denunciation of the dangers of corruption, his reference to Bonapartism—a concept 
borrowed from Karl Marx—has clearly no other purpose than to link his discourse 
with a prestigious theory of revolution.  
In this way, not only does he impress his Tigrayan base, but he also exposes the 
theoretical poverty of his opponents, in particular diminishing the military glory 
that they brandish at him. One can only agree with those delegates who could find 
no other way to express their bewilderment than to ask: “was it necessary to 
identify the problem as ‘Bonapartism?’”
34 
Some of them accused Zenawi of 
sabotaging the agenda of the meeting by putting forward an “unnecessary and 
obscure” notion, “just to pass off as a scholar.”
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Precisely, perfectly aware of the importance of theoretical ascendancy in the 
justification of power in Third World countries, Zenawi grasps with both hands the 
opportunity of following in the footsteps of Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, Kwame 
Nkrumah, and others, by playing the role of the philosopher-king to an audience 
longing for theoretical absolution in the absence of a high level of intellectual 
sophistication. We find theoretical ability ranked as the major requisite for 
leadership in the interview that Zenawi recently gave to Abyotawi Democracy, the 
official journal of the EPRDF. In that interview, Zenawi explains his own 
ascendancy thus: “What is important is the clarity of vision. Once you possess 
clarity in vision and a correct political line, competent leaders will necessarily 
emerge. From this viewpoint, the splinter group’s lack of clarity and incorrect 
political line is one that has lost track and is bound to lead them to confusion. It is 
impossible to provide competent leadership while one is in such a state of 
confusion.”
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One serious objection springs to mind: insofar as ethnicity is an attempt to 
return to the past and revive traditional identities and commitments, is it not 
contradictory to tie it to the colonized mind? Is not the search for a precolonial 
authenticity a turning of one’s back on the colonial legacy and model? No doubt, 
there is some such meaning. However, other than echoing, as we saw, the racist 
categorization of colonialism, the shift from Marxism-Leninism to 
ethnonationalism involves the elitist ethos. Indeed, scholars have been struck by 
the modernist language of ethnicity: it speaks in terms of justice, democracy, and 
self-determination, and educated groups are its most ardent supporters and leaders. 
Because of this modern content, many scholars rightly warn against any identifi-
cation of ethnicity with tribalism. Yet behind the modern and democratic language, 
there looms an ascriptive entitlement to power.  
As one scholar notes, “the rigidity of ascriptive characteristics that define 
ethnicity compared to the fluidity of alternative bases of identity (especially class) 
accounts for the comparative advantage of ethnicity in sustaining group 
solidarity.”
37 
In going back to the past, elites discover a new form of entitlement: 
the ascriptive right of kinship. According to this principle, the representatives of 
ethnic groups have or exercise power as a matter of natural right, of belonging to 
the same natural group. They are the natural representatives of the group; their 
entitlement is in the blood, in the ethnic belonging. No other people have the right 
to represent them: others are simply outsiders. Nor is there a more compelling 
principle of unity than natural solidarity; it even transcends classes and common 
economic interests. Class mobilization maintains entrenched disadvantages by 
subordinating particular interests to common interests, when what excluded groups 
need is the defense of their particularity. Because the alleged common interests 
usually favor the dominant ethnic group, minority groups prefer ethnic 
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mobilization to class unity.  
This work originally appeared in Northeast African Studies, 10:2, 2015, 
published by Michigan State University. 
But then, ethnicity is where the ideology of unanimity, deposited in the Leninist 
notion of working masses, achieves its perfect expression. Grant that “ethnic 
nationalism” is “a divide-and-rule strategy,”
38 
as Leenco Lata now concedes, and 
the ethnic group becomes the embodiment of unanimism: besides having common 
characteristics and a common history, members of an ethnic group are supposed to 
think alike and to have a common interest beyond class and status divisions. Better 
still, ethnic solidarity is presented as a normative behavior on the grounds that 
kinsmen are the most devoted representatives of the ethnic group. No better way 
exists to deliver a whole people into the hands of elitism than to promise a 
breakaway ethnic state or a state functioning on the basis of ethnic solidarity.
39 
 
Recall the logic that pushes Nkrumah to argue in favor of the one-party system. 
It says that the one-party system “is better able to express and satisfy the common 
aspirations of a nation as a whole, than a multiple-party parliamentary system, 
which is in fact only a ruse for perpetuating, and covers up, the inherent struggle 
between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’.”
40 
Evidently, the principle works 
beautifully for ethnicist politicians, whose basic credo is the origination of 
common aspirations from ethnic membership. Not only does ethnic solidarity 
replace class solidarity, the dividing line here being between the ethnically related 
and the alien, but also diversity is believed to be detrimental to the struggle. The 
notion of ethnicity is thus responsible for illusory conceptions of unity that lose 
sight of the social, economic, and ideological diversity within the ethnic group. 
From the alleged ethnic identity, it is wrongly deduced that all members think 
alike. This allows despots to stifle differences and initiatives in the name of ethnic 
unanimity: all that is dynamic, plural, and democratic is stigmatized as unethnical.  
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The enthronement of the enlightened few who alone illuminate the road to 
freedom follows as a matter of course. Nothing is more captivating than the elitist 
image of the rescuer: dragged from their natural society and subjugated to an alien 
power, oppressed ethnic groups need the tutorial leadership that puts them back 
into their authentic and original milieu. The ethnicist leader who claims to deliver 
his people from ethnic oppression provides no different spectacle from, say, that of 
Nkrumah forcefully imposing African socialism on a people that he otherwise 
declared to be socialist by tradition. In both cases, the elitist slip clearly transpires 
in the call for a tutorial state. There is no disparity between the ethnic principle of 
popular mobilization behind the enlightened few and Nkrumah’s pronouncement 
on the success of the anticolonial struggle. For both movements, success depends 
on the intervention of those who control knowledge. As Nkrumah puts it,  
this triumph must be accompanied by knowledge. For in the way that the 
process of natural evolution can be aided by human intervention based upon 
knowledge, so social evolution can be helped along by political intervention 
based upon knowledge of the laws of social development.
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Clearly, then, the imperative of a mass party guided by the enlightened few is 
how power and knowledge fall into the same hands, and government, thus armed 
with an ideology, changes into tutorship. The ethnic ideology of the return to the 
source gives a messianic stature to local elites, turning them into rescuers of the 
oppressed.  
Once ethnic solidarity becomes the principal rule, it stifles all dissident views 
by authorizing the characterization of all internal opposition as a betrayal of 
common interests. It institutes unanimity precisely around the leadership, 
canonized as the sole interpreter of the interests of the ethnic group. As was the 
case with Marxist-Leninist groups, this apology for unanimity is a justification for 
dictatorial regimes and undemocratic methods of ruling. If both ideologies 
converge on the necessity of the one-party system and the banishment of dissident 
views as well as on the rejection of individualism and the praise of the collective, it 
is because they work toward the goal of consecrating the absolute power of the 
enlightened few. The attraction of Marxist-Leninist groups to ethnicity is therefore 
inherent in the nature of ethnicity itself. If, as Leenco Lata remarks, “the members 
of the fronts that were more successful in implementing the Leninist organizational 
strategy tended not only to act as one person but to speak as one, too,”
42 
how much 
more so may ethnic leaders, and the ethnic society they fashion, act and speak as 
one.  
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This analysis of ethnicity must not be interpreted as a condemnation of ethnic 
politics in Ethiopia. The fact that an excluded group organizes itself and fights the 
exclusion cannot be rejected without going against democratization. Moreover, the 
inclusion of pluralism strongly favors the development of modern values by 
stimulating openness and competition. What is adverse, however, is the tendency 
of ethnic politics to harbor a separatist spirit by identifying the nation with the 
ethnic group. The use of ethnicity to break up the state confuses what is essentially 
a problem of democratization with the emergence of a new ethnic state whose 
democratization is yet to come. When ethnically related people control the state, 
issues pertaining to democratization and modernization are not yet done away 
with. On the contrary, the ideology of relatedness can become even tougher to 
democratize, inasmuch as it is little prone to the impersonalization of the state. The 
question is then to know to what extent the defense of the ascriptive rights of 
ethnicity is compatible with the principle of modernity, which decrees the depen-
dence of the status and place of individuals on their achievement. Unless the 
entitlement promoted by ethnicity is reconciled with the competitive principle, the 
style of household politics will prevail, to the detriment of public accountability 
and democratic rules.  
One of the major reasons for the proliferation of corruption in Ethiopian society 
is the excessive valorization of relatedness, to the disadvantage of impersonal 
relations and accountability. To recognize corruption as the major scourge of 
Ethiopian society is to admit the corrosive effect of ethnicization. Blaming 
“Bonapartism” only creates a muddle that may retard the admittance of a wrong 
policy, but does not reduce, even slightly, the evil. The government’s present 
crackdown on corruption, assuming that it is sincere, can succeed only if the 
system is so changed that a growing impersonalization of Ethiopian society takes 
place. This means the promotion of pan-Ethiopian standards in conjunction with 
the operation of free market relations, in short, the urgent need to get out of the 
ethnic paradigm.  
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